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Abstract. Since the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, and especially in the past few years, the 
European Union has been going through a mixed process of expansion and consolidation. In 
the last ten years alone there were two new waves of accession, the EU launched the single 
currency and failed attempts have been made to introduce a constitution. With all these 
transformations taking place, attention is more and more centred on the question whether 
a European identity is emerging. This article investigates this issue examining comparatively 
the  patterns  of  national  identity  and  of  European  identity  formation  and  focusing  on 
whether the relationship between the two is a zero-sum type. The aim is to show that 
although national identity is not necessarily an obstacle for the development of European 
identity, nationalism is. 
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Introduction 
 
An important issue of current debate about identity in the European Union 
centres  on  whether  or  not  the  process  of  construction  of  a  European  identity 
necessarily requires the ‘erosion’ of national identity to the extent that European 
identity would take primacy over it. The aim of this paper is to engage with such 
debates and to evaluate the relationship between national identity and European 
identity using an approach based primarily on nationalist theory.  
I argue that, for theoretical and heuristic reasons, nationalist theory can 
provide a framework for the analysis of European identity formation. Comparing 
the patterns and processes involved in forging European identity with those that                       
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have taken place in the formation of national identity could offer insights into the 
methods appropriate to European identity formation. 
As in the case of the nationalist elites, the political elites of the European 
Union employ specific myths and values in order to rally support and to create a 
sense of belonging: there is a process of selection of these elements according to 
their  potential  to  ‘resonate’  with  people’s  consciousness.  The  selection  of  a 
European  flag,  a  European  anthem  and  even  a  European  Day  are  but  some 
examples for the creation of a symbolic discourse that aims to convey a sense of 
unity within the European Union. 
This paper aims to assess whether national identity and European identity 
are to some degree mutually exclusive. 
 
1.  National identity and nationalism  
 
What do we mean by national identity and how is it constructed? Without 
rehearsing the debates in the field of nationalist studies between various ‘camps’ 
(primordialists, perennialists, ethno-symbolists and modernists), I will state that my 
approach rests on the modernist claims that nations are modern constructs, that 
nationalism  preceded  (and  indeed  led  to)  the  creation  of  nations,  and  that 
nationalism is primarily a political ideology concerned with power and the modern 
state (Gellner 1965, 168; Hobsbawm, 1992, 10; Breuilly, 1993, 1). National identity 
is a type of collective identity that gives allegiance to the nation. The concept of 
nation  is  an  elusive  one  (Gellner,  1983,  6),  which  in  minimalist  terms  can  be 
understood  as  a community  – an  ‘imagined  community’  as  Anderson  (1991,  6) 
argues – of equal individuals who share a set of common values. There is also some 
degree of agreement among critics that membership in the  nation contains an 
objective dimension and a subjective one. The first has to do with aspects such as 
territory, mass education, and, more importantly, common legal rights and duties 
and a claim to sovereignty (Gellner, 1983, 7; Smith, 1993, 30). The latter refers to a 
common culture, which functions as the cement that unites the members of the 
community. It is important to stress the difference between ‘nation’ and ‘state’. 
While the nation is the community of people that share a sense of common history 
and culture, the state is a legal entity that has to do with power and authority and 
possesses both internal and external sovereignty over its territory and its body of 
citizens, and is constituted in the form of laws (Habermas, 1998, 107). However,  
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the two concepts are conflated by the nationalist ideology, whose main tenet is 
that the nation should be able to fulfill itself politically through state power. This 
connection is reinforced even at the level of culture: national identity has to make 
reference to state institutions to the extent that culture – conceived in national 
terms  –  is  produced,  reproduced  and  transmitted  within  institutionalised 
frameworks. What makes a culture ‘national’ is precisely the fact that it is regulated 
through  institutional  constraints  (standardised  language,  educational  systems, 
etc.).  
As such, the process of nation-building and of national identity formation is 
a political product: it is directed towards acquiring or maintaining state-power, and 
it is the product of elites who use materials from group cultures in order to rally 
mass support (Breuilly, 1993, 2, Brass, 1991, 8). Despite some critics’
1 tendencies to 
discount its role in the development of nationalism, culture does play a crucial role 
in the process of identity formation and it can also help to account for the often 
non-rational character of nationalism. The function of ‘myths, memories, values 
and symbols’ in nation formation becomes more visible with modernisation and 
the  advent  of  ‘print  capitalism’  (Smith,  1986,  15;  Anderson,  1991).  They  are 
strengthened by the shift from an oral to a written culture. Their mass availability 
contributes, as “a crucial instrument in cultural reproduction”, to the creation of 
“means of allegiance on the basis of social identification” (Schöpflin, 1997, 21). 
Thus, Smith is correct in assuming that these symbols and myths of communal past 
are essential in binding communities together. However, construction of the nation 
should be seen as a top to bottom process, where nationalist elites select, modify, 
use and often fabricate such myths of common descent – as Breuilly (1996, 150-
152) points out – in order to forge a sense of loyalty to national community they 
claim  to  represent
2.  Whether  these  stories  of  communal  past  are  genuine  or 
fictitious is not particularly relevant for the study of nationalism: as long as the 
members of groups perceive them as real, and as long they are effective as means 
                                                           
1 See Breuilly’s statement: “To focus upon culture, ideology, identity, class or modernisation 
is to neglect the fundamental point that nationalism is, above and beyond all else, about 
politics and that politics is about power” (Breuilly, 1993, 1).  
2 In The Sacred and the Profane, Mircea Eliade offers some good examples of how myths 
are created on a very loose basis of real events: on the one hand there are the real events (a 
young man goes into the woods, falls off a cliff and dies) and on the other hand there is the 
mythologised interpretation of the event (a young man goes into the woods, he is cursed by 
the witch of the forest, loses his mind, throws himself off a cliff and dies). The role of the 
myths is to offer models of conduct, which are dictated by supernatural powers.                        
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of  rallying  support  for  the  nation,  they  should  be  considered  when  examining 
nationalist discourse. 
2.  Pattern of European Identity Construction 
 
In the case of European identity, one can notice patterns strikingly similar 
to  those  of  national  identity  construction.  Of  course,  as  this  process  is  in 
progress,  some  aspects  are  better  developed,  whereas  other  are  less  clearly 
shaped. Nevertheless, what we have in the case of the European Union – which is 
recognisable  from  the  framework  of  the  nation-state  –  is  both  the  objective 
dimension: there is a territory, and there are sets of common legal rights and 
duties,  which  are  manifest  through  the  agency  of  institutionalised  state-like 
structures, and the subjective one: loyalty to the political community is being 
constructed  through  the  employment  of  the  same  elements  for  symbolic 
selection, reinforcement and reproduction (historical myths, symbols, etc.). 
Equally importantly, the project of the European Union is fundamentally 
elite-driven, in the same way the national projects are, which spreads gradually 
from  top  to  bottom,  explaining  why  identification  with  and  support  for  the 
construction of a united European community is higher among political and social 
elites and lower at the grass-roots level (at least in the initial stages) (Llobera, 
2003, 164; Risse, 2005, 296). 
At the institutional and legal (objective) level it can be argued that the 
European Union has already moved far beyond the initial project of an economic 
community (and a cooperation limited to coal and steel as the 1951 Treaty of 
Paris  established)  and  has  taken  –  to  all  intents  and  purpose  –  the  shape  of 
statehood. Various stages in the development of the European Union reflect the 
non-linear  character  of  the  project.  Delanty  distinguishes  three  phases  in  the 
evolution of the European venture, each corresponding to an important shift in 
focus  (and  to  a  change  in  name).  In  the  aftermath  of  WWII,  the  European 
Economic  Community  (EEC)  emphasised  close  economic  ties  based  on 
cooperation between sovereign states. In the second phase – in the 1980’s – 
when  the  adjective  ‘economic’  was  dropped  (EC),  there  is  a  move  from 
cooperation  to  interdependence,  with  an  enhanced  legal  and  administrative 
integration, but still maintaining the emphasis on sovereign states. Since the early 
1990’s, with the new phase emerging, the name was changed to European Union 
(EU)  and  the  focus  shifted  to  social  integration,  with  increasing  law  and  
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regulatory  policies  and  with  the  new  legal  concept  of  European  citizenship 
(Delanty, 2000, 109-110). Moreover, the institutional framework of the European 
Union – the European Commission, the European Court of Justice, the European 
Central Bank, etc. are independent from national governments; the members of 
the representative institutions – the Council of Ministers, the European Council 
and the European Parliament have the double mission of acting as government 
and constituency representatives while, at the same time, representing the Union 
as a whole (Laffan, 2004, 84-85). 
In parallel to these supranational institutional developments, deliberate 
efforts from the Union have been visible, especially in last decades, towards the 
construction  of  some  sense  of  European  collective  identity,  at  least  at  the 
symbolic  level.  A  range  of  techniques  has  been  employed  in  this  process. 
Powerful symbols, usually associated with the nation-state have been created: 
the European Union has a flag, an anthem, a Europe Day and a motto. Perhaps 
the most significant symbol of European unity is the common currency, the euro, 
which – besides its obvious value as a unified medium of exchange, “[has] been 
designed to appeal to a pan-EU audience […] each of the seven notes bear[ing] 
the  image  of  a  bridge  intended  to  represent  different  European  architectural 
styles” (Dunkerley et al., 2002, 118).  
The  EU  has  also  placed  significant  focus  on  education,  creating 
programmes fittingly called Leonardo da Vinci, Erasmus, Comenius and Tempus 
encouraging cultural exchange. 
 The  goal  of  such  projects  is  two-fold.  On  the  one  hand  they  have  a 
formal, subjective value, which is to create a sense of solidarity by appealing (as 
in the cases of the anthem and of the names of the education) to personalities 
that have universal, but also European (especially through geographical location) 
value. On the other hand, there is a deeper level of substance at which they 
operate. These programmes play the role of exposing the younger generation to 
patterns of cooperation and cultural exchange between various parts of Europe, 
and thus, emphasise similarity (in diversity – as the EU strives to achieve) rather 
than difference. 
Finally, the drive towards the forging of a European identity is also visible 
in the language employed in EU discourse. “Messages […] based on such values as 
‘peace’, ‘unity’, ‘friendship’, ‘harmony’, and the like […] directly stress the desire                       
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of European institutions to present ‘Europe’ as a human community” (Brutter, 
2005, 128).   
 
3.  National and European Identities: Conflict or Mutual Recognition? 
 
I have so far focused on showing the similarities between national identity 
and  European  identity  in  terms  patterns  of  construction  and  articulation.  This 
discussion,  however,  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  the  two  identities  are 
incompatible, that the relationship between them is a zero-sum type or that in 
order  for  European  identity  to  develop,  national  identity  needs  to  be  at  least 
eroded. 
In examining whether national identity and European identity are mutually 
exclusive or at least hostile to one another, I will engage with two types of views: 
on the one hand with those claiming that national and European identities are in 
competition and that in the foreseeable future national identity is likely to endure 
(an opinion shared primarily – but not exclusively – by scholars of nationalism who 
argue for the pre-modern roots of nations, such as Smith). On the other hand, 
there  is  the  view  –  defended  by  Habermas,  among  others –  that the  bases of 
identification with the European community are radically different from those with 
the national community; national and European identities are, thus, compatible 
and they can coexist peacefully. 
Both  these  types of  arguments  rest on  the  generally  agreed  claim  that 
people can have multiple identities. There are various models of observing any 
hierarchical pattern to how these identities are displayed as well as the interaction 
between  them.    One  can  distinguish  between  nested  identities  (conceived  as 
concentric circles or Russian Matruska dolls),  ‘marble-cake’ type identities (that 
cannot  be  separated  on different  levels  and where  components  influence  each 
other),  cross-cutting,  or  separate  (Risse,  2005,  295-296;  Herrmann  and  Brewer, 
2004, 8). Also, within the multitude of identities and individual has, it is important 
to recognise the role of choice in shaping the weight given to particular identities 
(Sen, 2006, 4). 
This framework opens the possibility for national and European identities 
to coexist. Although individuals may have multiple identities, specific contexts and 
circumstances dictate which identity becomes more important (to the extent that it 
takes primacy over any other) at a particular time. The nature of the relationship  
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between different identities is dictated by the categories those identities belong to. 
One can distinguish between contrasting and non-contrasting identities: the first 
type accounts for the identification with groups belonging to the same category, 
while the latter refers to groups belonging to different categories (Sen, 2006, 28). 
On this basis, as national and European identities compete – as I have shown – over 
identical types of structures (both objectively and subjectively), it is conceivable 
that there are conditions that may cause national identity to come into conflict 
with European identity. Factors such as economic decline, migration, etc., can bring 
about such re-evaluations of identities.  
Smith  argues  that  such  situations  are  important,  and  that  European 
identity is not attainable at the expense of national identity. His argument is based 
on the claim that national identity, once established, is impossible to remove (short 
of genocide), as it reinforces itself on the basis of its links with the older cultural 
myths, memories, values and symbols of the core ethnie. By contrast, European 
identity  cannot  command  such  emotional  commitment  because  it  lacks  such 
deeply rooted rituals and ceremonies of collective identification (Smith, 1992, 73; 
Smith, 1993, 30, 131-134). 
Similarly, Shore points out that European identity formation fails where 
national identities have succeeded. He argues that Europe’s common values such 
as  “Greco-Roman  tradition,  Judeo-Christian  ethics,  Renaissance  humanism  and 
individualism,  Enlightenment  rationalism  and  science,  civil  right  tradition, 
democracy  and  the  rule  of  law,  etc.”  are  inadequate  in  providing  solidarity; 
moreover, deeply rooted values such as language, historical myths, memories and 
symbols emphasise division rather than unity (Shore 1998, in Llobera, 2003, 165). 
The other category of arguments suggests that European identity can be 
constructed and can function alongside national identities, because their markers 
of  cohesiveness  are  different.  Unlike  national  identities  which  are  based  on 
perceived primordial allegiances and are enforced by shared cultures and history, 
attachment  to  the  European  Union  can  be  based  on  what  Habermas  calls 
‘constitutional patriotism’; this rests on popular sovereignty and human rights and 
is shaped by the emergence of a European public sphere, of a political culture 
shared by all citizens of Europe (Llobera, 2003, 166, Habermas, 2001, 16). 
The  empirical  evidence  brought  forward  to  contradict  the  opinion  that 
national  identity  and  European  identity  operate  in  zero-sum  terms  is  generally 
drawn from surveys (such as the Eurobarometer). Quoting Carey (2002) and Citrin                       
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and Sides (2004), Risse suggests that such surveys show that national identification 
and European identification are not perceived as contradictory: people feel part of 
both  communities  (Risse,  2005,  295).  Further  survey  results  come  to  similar 
conclusions: a higher identification with the EU does not involve a lower level of 
national identity (Castano, 2004, 50). 
I will now turn to these arguments and explore them. Smith is correct in 
pointing  out  that  culture  plays  a  crucial  role  in  determining  the  nature  of  the 
relationship between national and European identities. He also concedes that if the 
nation is regarded as a civic construct, based on voluntary association of rational 
citizens, the conflict is less apparent, whereas when the nation is viewed as an 
organic, cultural unit, the contradiction becomes sharper (Smith, 1992, 56). The 
distinction  between  civic/political  and  ethnic/cultural  nations,  however,  is  not 
helpful,  because  it  points  to  ideal-type  cases that are  not mirrored  by  real-life 
equivalents. Nations that are regarded more or less as models of the civic type 
(such as Britain, the United States or France) limit consistently membership in the 
nation  according  to  ‘ethnic’  criteria.  One  needs  to  look  no  further  than  the 
immigration laws of such countries where exclusion from citizenship continues to 
occur on the basis of ancestry, blood, etc (Spencer and Wollman, 2002, 104-105). 
Thus, it is difficult to conceive many communities that are – as Habermas 
argues  –  solely  linked  by  abstract  notions  of  civic  duties  and  human  rights. 
Underneath all this there has to exist some perceived sense of common culture, 
which  provides  and  emotional  bond  to  the  members  of  the  community.  The 
emotional aspect is crucial in reinforcing identity, even when that identity rest on 
individual freedom and rights. Even when the latter (rights and duties) remain very 
important, the discourse of flagging of identity finds it necessarily to go beyond 
them  and  to  appeal  to  some  kind  of  revered  cultural  baggage.  In  his  famous 
Gettysburg  Address,  Abraham  Lincoln  does  precisely  that,  invoking  the  “hollow 
ground,  “the  brave  men,  living  and  dead,  who  struggled  here  [and  who]  have 
consecrated it [so] that this nation, under God
3, shall have a new birth of freedom” 
in order to command loyalty to a nation “conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the 
proposition that all men are created equal” (Lincoln, 1863, online). 
                                                           
3 There is considerable scholarly debate whether the words ‘under God’ were part of the draft 
Lincoln used to address the Union. The version used here is the one inscribed on the walls at 
the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, D.C.  
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In contrast to Smith’s argument, I have suggested that a sense of belonging 
based on such values has been constructed in the case of the nation-state, and 
there is no reason why it cannot be replicated – and indeed it is being constructed 
– in the case of the European Union. 
In principle, the ‘withering away’ of national identity is not a prerequisite 
for  the  construction  of  European  identity.  People  can  have  multiple  identities. 
What makes the relationship between these particular two special is: 1. the fact 
that they compete on the same type of institutional frameworks; and 2. the fact 
that they compete on the same type of symbols. 
Most importantly, national identity is the basis for the nationalist ideology, 
and nationalism claims that the nation should take primacy over all other forms of 
social identification. On that basis, nationalism is able to command allegiance and 
loyalty against anything that could threaten (or be seen as threatening) the nation 
(national sovereignty): 
  
The stronger the bond that an individual feels towards the nation, 
the  less  likely  that  individual  will  approve  of  measures  that 
decrease  national  influence  over  economics  and  politics.  The 
growth  in  the  scope  of  the  European  Union  in  the  realm  of 
economics, politics and culture, which have previously been under 
the sole control of the nation-state, impinges on this view of the 
nation. (Carey, 2002, 391) 
 
The implication is not that national identity functions as a barrier for the 
development of European identity, but that nationalism does. National identity is 
flagged  and  emphasised  on  a  daily  basis  through  what  Billig  calls  ‘banal 
nationalism’ and it is embedded in the daily routines through “words of linguistic 
‘deixis’” such as ‘we’, ‘this’, ‘here’ etc. (1995, 94). This everyday, yet hardly benign 
nationalism  becomes  habitual,  yet  the  mysticism  of  the  ‘homeland’  can  easily 
invoke  the  loyalty  and  sacrifice  of  the  people,  when  “competing  visions  of 
homelands draw different boundaries around the same places” (Billig, 1995, 78). 
Although survey show – as mentioned earlier – that people feel that they belong to 
both national and European communities simultaneously, when it comes to the 
transfer of sovereignty from the nation-state to the EU (i.e. when the two come 
into  potential  contrast),  nationalism  is  able  to  influence  choices,  through  its                       
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emotive powers. It is the emotional force that plays an important role in evaluating 
identity in such cases rather then civic values or even profit. As Risse (2005, 297) 
points out, categories of people such as farmers and women should, in theory, be 
more supportive and loyal to the EU, the first group because the EU spends the 
largest percent of the budget on its common agricultural policy, and the second 
because the EU championed gender equality; despite all this, support for the EU is 
rather low in both cases.  
A  solution  for  national  and  European  identity  to  co-exist  is  if  national 
identity disengages from the nationalist claim about the necessity to be congruent 
with  the  state.  The  two  can  share  their  common  grounds  as  well  as recognise 
differences in a harmonious way only when they stop competing over the same 
institutional  framework.  In  other  words,  for  European  identity  to  take  off  it  is 
necessary to separate nationality and citizenship and “to extract the nation from 
the state and shape it into a more flexible cultural process independent of political 
institutions”  (Prentoulis,  2001,  205).  This  is  not  to  say  with  certainty  that  a 
European identity will develop; rather, that European identity construction is a long 
term  process,  which  depends  on  various  context  (not  least  the  decrease  in 
nationalist support), but has the potential to realise itself because it contains an 
‘objective possibility’, much in the sense Llobera (using Fouillée) talks about the 
concept of idée-force (2003, 156). 
 
Conclusions 
 
This article has examined the relationship between national identity and 
European  identity,  focusing  on  two  directions  of  thought:  one  that  claims  that 
national identity and European identity are conflicting and that European identity is 
not likely to replace national identity; and the other that argues that European 
identity is constructed on an entirely different basis than national identity and the 
two can coexist. 
On  the  one  hand,  it  has  been  argued  that  European  identity  cannot 
compete with national identity because it does not have deep rooted memories, 
myths and traditions that can induce a sense of loyalty the same way national 
identity does. On the other hand it has been argued that national identity and 
European identity do not clash, because their bases for allegiance are different. 
Unlike national identity which rests on a common culture to bind people, European  
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identity is constructed around ‘constitutional patriotism’ and individual rights and 
freedoms.  
There are reasons to believe that both these views offer a narrow picture 
of the relationship between the two identities. I have argued that the formation of 
European identity involves forging symbols, myths and memories in the same way 
national identity did. Because these myths and memories are not fixed (although 
they  are  often  perceived to  be),  there  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  these  new 
constructs cannot become as powerful as the national ones and that, indeed, they 
can override national them. Second, although European identity is to a large degree 
based on principles of popular sovereignty and civic rights, it still needs a shared 
‘culture’  to  connect  people  at  an  emotional  level.  Finally,  I  have  argued  that 
although both European identity and national identity are created following similar 
patterns they do not necessarily clash. It is nationalism rather than national identity 
that could hinder the development of the European identity. 
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